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Abstract
Rationale, aims, and objectives: Healthcare systems worldwide devote significant
resources towards collecting data to support care quality assurance and improve-
ment. In the United Kingdom, National Clinical Audits are intended to contribute to
these objectives by providing public reports of data on healthcare treatment and out-
comes, but their potential for quality improvement in particular is not realized fully
among healthcare providers. Here, we aim to explore this outcome from the perspec-
tive of hospital boards and their quality committees: an under-studied area, given the
emphasis in previous research on the audits' use by clinical teams.
Methods: We carried out semi-structured, qualitative interviews with 54 staff in dif-
ferent clinical and management settings in five English National Health Service hospi-
tals about their use of NCA data, and the circumstances that supported or
constrained such use. We used Framework Analysis to identify themes within their
responses.
Results: We found that members and officers of hospitals' governing bodies per-
ceived an imbalance between the benefits to their institutions from National Clinical
Audits and the substantial resources consumed by participating in them. This led
some to question the audits' legitimacy, which could limit scope for improvements
based on audit data, proposed by clinical teams.
Conclusions: Measures to enhance the audits' perceived legitimacy could help
address these limitations. These include audit suppliers moving from an emphasis on
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cumulative, retrospective reports to real-time reporting, clearly presenting the “head-
line” outcomes important to institutional bodies and staff. Measures may also include
further negotiation between hospitals, suppliers and their commissioners about the
nature and volume of data the latter are expected to collect; wider use by hospitals of
routine clinical data to populate audit data fields; and further development of interac-
tive digital technologies to help staff explore and report audit data in meaningful ways.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Healthcare systems worldwide devote significant resources towards
collecting data to support care quality assurance (QA) and improve-
ment (QI). Mechanisms include disease and device registries, such as
the National Cardiovascular Data Registry's ACTION Registry-Get
With The Guidelines in the United States, which provides hospitals
with detailed data to improve care for patients with acute myocardial
infarction,1 and national and regional benchmarking systems, like Hos-
pital Compare in the United States,2 which provides hospital ratings
based on measures such as mortality, safety of care and patient expe-
rience. In the United Kingdom, healthcare providers within the
National Health Service (NHS) participate in over 50 National Clinical
Audits (NCAs). NCAs were first established in the 1990s by organiza-
tions such as professional bodies and healthcare charities, to minimize
variation in the quality of care and promote improvement. They carry
out these functions by providing national, public reports of data about
patient treatments and outcomes in distinct clinical specialities or con-
ditions. The Myocardial Ischaemia National Audit Project (MINAP), for
example, was established in 1998 to enable hospitals to assess and
improve their performance in meeting the requirements of the
National Service Framework for Coronary Heart Disease.3 More
recently, the NHS contracted an independent charity, the Healthcare
Quality Improvement Partnership (HQIP), to commission and manage
a number of audits - currently 30 - through the National Clinical Audit
and Patient Outcomes Programme (NCAPOP). Hospitals' participation
in NCAPOP audits is a condition of the NHS Standard Contract.
Whilst the NHS, HQIP and suppliers attempt to ensure that NCAs
represent value for money and that only essential audits with the
potential for significant impact are undertaken (by, for example, sup-
pliers consulting with clinical advisory groups), NCAs nevertheless
consume many resources.4 Hospitals not only pay a proportion of
NCAPOP running costs, but must also meet the substantial costs to
themselves of participating in the audits (associated, for example, with
data entry and validation) from within their existing budgets.
NCAs, then, are designed to facilitate measurement of care qual-
ity to support both QA and QI. As others have noted,5,6 there are
important differences between these processes. Quality assurance
involves the use of quality monitoring and reporting, informed by
national standards, guidelines and targets, to ensure that minimum
standards are met and poor performance is addressed. Thus, it focuses
on providing reassurance about current care quality. By contrast, QI
involves the use of systematic methods and tools to improve out-
comes for patients continuously. Here, data are used to identify areas
for improvement and inform how care could be improved. Whilst
there is evidence for both QA and QI associated with NCAs and other
such systems worldwide,7-11 there are reports of variation in how hos-
pitals engage with them, particularly for QI, and consequently their
potential to support systematic improvement in patient care and
safety is not realized.4,12-14
Against this background, this paper suggests ways in which
national audit data might be used more fully, focusing on their use for
QI by the bodies and staff that govern hospitals, and the conse-
quences for clinical users. Given the focus on clinical teams in previ-
ous research, this perspective is not well understood, despite the
significance of senior managerial and board involvement in QI, identi-
fied in key reports such as that of the Francis Inquiry.15
2 | METHODS
2.1 | Study design
The data in this paper were collected as part of a wider qualitative
study that explored how and for what purpose NCAs are used across
hospitals, to inform the development of a web-based, interactive NCA
quality dashboard. The study involved carrying out semi-structured
interviews with participants, and the use of Framework Analysis16 to
identify themes within their responses. Here, we focus on use of NCA
data by members and supporting officers of hospital boards and their
quality committees (who, owing to the institution-wide nature of their
roles, are referred to as institutional staff ); what factors constrain such
use; and consequent effects on QI. This involves examining relation-
ships between institutional and clinical data users.
2.2 | Sample
Our sampling strategy aimed to capture variation in hospitals, NCAs
and user groups. Data were collected across five English NHS
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hospitals, including three large teaching hospitals and two smaller dis-
trict general hospitals. Many of the staff we interviewed (especially
institutional staff) worked with multiple NCAs, but to obtain a more
detailed picture of audit use, we focused on two NCAPOP audits:
MINAP and the Paediatric Intensive Care Audit Network (PICANet),
which are delivered by different suppliers, involve different clinical
specialities and professional groups, and incorporate multiple mea-
sures. To extend our understanding of NCAs with different character-
istics, we also explored use of independently-funded audits such as
the National Audit of Cardiac Rehabilitation (NACR), and audits that
provide individual operator feedback, like the audits of the British
Association of Urological Surgeons (BAUS).
Using purposive and snowball methods, we recruited 54 partici-
pants across institutional areas and clinical units within the hospitals
(see Table 1). We started by interviewing lead NCA contacts, often
senior clinicians, and asked them to identify others involved with the
audits, including 32 clinicians and 16 managers (11 of whom who
worked institutionally as members or supporting officers of hospital
boards and their quality sub-committees).
2.3 | Data collection and analysis
Semi-structured qualitative interviews took place with participants
between November 30, 2017 and June 6, 2018, using a schedule
developed by the research team. The schedule was reviewed by the
study Lay Advisory Group and revised, in light of their feedback, to
ensure that the interviews covered topics relevant to patients. The
interviews were carried out by NA, LM and RR, and ranged from 33 to
89 minutes, with a median length of 57 minutes. They included a dis-
cussion of participants' backgrounds and roles, their use of NCA data,
and the circumstances that supported or constrained such use. Audio-
recordings of the interviews were transcribed verbatim and
anonymised.
Interview data were analysed using Framework Analysis,16 an
approach developed for use with qualitative data in applied policy
research, which involves familiarizing oneself with the data through
repeated reading of transcripts, before developing a thematic frame-
work and indexing. Our thematic framework was developed by the
research team, who agreed initial codes for indexing the data and then
indexed five transcripts to test the applicability of codes and assess
agreement. Codes were refined and definitions clarified where there
was variation, and refined codes were applied to all transcripts, using
NVivo 11. Subsequently, themes were mapped and interpreted: a pro-
cess that enabled practice to be examined within and across cases,
and convergence and divergence in participants' responses to be iden-
tified and explored.
2.4 | Ethics
The University of Leeds School of Healthcare Research Ethics Com-
mittee gave ethical approval for the study (approval number:
HREC16-044). All participants received an information sheet
explaining the study's aims, how their input would be used and confi-
dentiality assured, to which they gave their written, informed consent.
Where face-to-face interviews could not be arranged and telephone
interviews took place instead, verbal consent was recorded.
3 | FINDINGS
3.1 | How NCA data are used institutionally in
hospitals
English NHS hospitals are governed by boards, which have a remit to
build public and stakeholder confidence in the quality, safety, respon-
siveness and value of the healthcare they provide.17 In all five hospi-
tals in the study they discharged this responsibility by monitoring a
wide range of performance metrics associated with local and national
agendas. Often, such monitoring was informed by dashboards that
displayed performance levels for various metrics, and sought to
align them.
In general, the detailed information about treatment and out-
comes provided by NCAs did not feature among these core metrics,
except in the case of NCA measures deemed by boards to be publicly
and politically sensitive, such as mortality or waiting times. In
maintaining oversight of such “headline” measures, institutional staff
focused their attention on the cumulative (often annual) public reports
provided by NCA suppliers, which include national data summaries.
Institutional staff were motivated to monitor their hospital's perfor-
mance in these reports because of their public nature, and the risk to
their reputations for safe and effective care if they appeared as “nega-
tive outliers” in the reports, performing below acceptable levels:
Because it's such a public issue is the mortality data,
not only in the public but also in the sort of the man-
agement of the Trust, they've always got an eye on the
real headline values from each of the national audits
TABLE 1 Participant roles
Institutional and managerial roles Number
Hospital board/quality committee members 5
Institutional quality managers 3
Institutional information managers 3
Divisional and departmental managers 5
Total 16
Clinical Team Roles
Doctors 13
Nurses 15
Non-clinical support staff 4
Total 32
Others 6
Grand Total 54
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that apply to the whole Trust (Paediatric intensive care
consultant).
Public NCA reports were also of interest institutionally
because they facilitate benchmarking against comparator organi-
zations, with which hospitals may be competing for patients and
resources, and because the reports demonstrate achievement of
certain standards of care associated with financial incentives. For
example, timely provision of angiography for cardiac patients,
included in the MINAP report, is associated with Best Practice
Tariff funding. In such cases, institutional staff monitored their
hospital's performance in the reports to protect or enhance their
incomes.
Boards did not receive NCA reports themselves, however.
Instead, they oversaw an assurance framework, within which respon-
sibility for reviewing reports in detail was delegated to clinicians, who,
typically, provided summaries of issues raised in reports and action
plans to address any concerns, including recommendations for
QI. These summaries were often widely circulated to clinical, divi-
sional and institutional staff, but institutional committees discussed
them by exception only, when particular risks had been identified and
they were involved in approving (or rejecting) the associated financial
and strategic implications.
Finally, every year boards received and published quality
accounts, which included a summary of those NCAs hospitals partici-
pated in, and information about improvements made in response to
their report recommendations. Boards are advised by NHS England to
refer within these accounts to audits included in an annually-
published list, which includes both NCAPOP and other audits. Inclu-
sion on the list varies from year-to-year and is determined by a num-
ber of criteria: for example, whether public reports are published
within 12 months of completion of the most recent clinical event. Not
all NCAPOP audits are included. MINAP, for example, was not
included on the latest list, despite being mandatory, whereas some
non-NCAPOP audits are included, such as the NACR and BAUS audits
we studied.
3.1.1 | Using NCAs for QA and QI
The above findings point to a focus on institutional committees using
NCA data to assure care quality, rather than directly improve
it. Improvement, stimulated or informed by the data, tended to be
driven, “bottom-up,” by clinical areas. This emphasis reflected man-
agers' belief that clinicians were best placed to improve care quality,
given their intimate understanding of clinical data. Institutional bod-
ies' role in QI tended, instead, to be indirect, in that improvement
often costs money, and approval of significant resource or strategic
implications was at these bodies' discretion. To this end, clinicians
submitted business cases for QI projects, based on NCA data, to divi-
sional and then institutional committees, as a consultant paediatri-
cian explained:
We use [NCA data] to make business cases that go ini-
tially through the children's hospital management,
which then gets, well in the current financial climate it
then has to go to board-level to get approved, if there's
a major change in structure.
3.2 | Constraints on institutional use of NCA data
3.2.1 | Retrospective reporting
The retrospective nature of data within public NCA reports limited
their usefulness for institutional staff: for example, data in the
September 2019 MINAP report were at least 18 months old on publi-
cation. The time lag was regarded as unhelpful, given the need to
respond rapidly to problems with care quality and for business cases
to be evidenced using recent information. This limitation could gener-
ate additional work for committees and staff, leading to frustration
and disengagement with the audits. A quality committee member, for
example, described problems associated with being unable to access
recent NCA data, when the committee sought to monitor the effect
of action taken by a clinical area with outlying mortality rates. In this
case, NCA data were only available from the supplier every 6 months:
I haven't got six months. I can't do something and fin-
gers crossed and hoping six months later that it's got
better. We're talking about mortality: that's not reason-
able. So I have to actually put in additional metrics to
make sure that we're monitoring things month-on-
month as a minimum to make sure that we aren't put-
ting patients at risk. (Quality committee member).
We found differences between NCAs, however, in terms of the
contemporaneity of the data they made available. Some not only pro-
vided retrospective public reports, but also offered real-time access to
data via their websites, recalibrated each time hospitals submitted
new information. The National Hip Fracture Database was given as an
example of such good practice:
Every time you put a patient on that database, the key
performance indicators are actually flagged and re-
based. So we know, after every patient that we put in,
what our compliance is […]. If any of them dip below
the appropriate compliance, then that supports a
review, potential investigation and audit. (Institutional
clinical audit manager).
The participant went onto explain that “seeing it visually, real
time, as we submit our data, makes a significant difference in how
quickly we can react to a potential drop in performance or compliance
with standards,” linking timely provision of national data to institu-
tional capacity for effective QA and QI.
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3.2.2 | Heterogeneous reporting
The heterogeneous presentation of NCA public reports presented
problems for institutional committee members, tasked with reviewing
complex provision across organizations in limited timeframes, because
it made it difficult to summarize or compare them efficiently:
They all get published at different times. They all use
different presentations of the data. They all do their
risk adjustment individually. They all do their metrics
all different. Some for very good reasons […] But if
your job is to summarise […] 20 of them, you can't do
it in a sort of automated way. It's all very manual.
(Institutional information manager)
Managers complained about the number and length of reports,
which often extend to well over 30 pages of A4 text, plus long data
tables. Committee members were also frustrated by reports that did
not unambiguously highlight the “headline” metrics and other informa-
tion they considered important, such as benchmarking data, or which
did not make clear recommendations for institutional action. There
was a need for “tools that can help point us in the right direction
rather than having to work it out for ourselves” (Institutional quality
manager) and it was suggested that dashboards could fulfil this func-
tion in institutional committees, because they present data clearly and
concisely.
3.2.3 | Unrealistic and changing metrics
As well as expressing concern about the presentation of NCA reports,
institutional staff noted that some audits included measures they reg-
arded as unrealistic and unaffordable:
Some of them are a bit gold-plated and […] have come
out of a group of enthusiastic clinicians […] coming up
with standards that were like: design me the very best
system you could think of. But, unfortunately we prob-
ably can't afford those. The other thing about them is,
that there often isn't the workforce, even if you could
afford them, there aren't the people out there to
employ to be able to deliver it. (Board member)
They talked about audits that lacked coherence or asked for too
much data, without due regard to the resource implications for hospi-
tals or the utility of those data for either institutional or clinical users.
Managers were particularly frustrated by NCA suppliers changing or
adding to their metrics significantly, which generated a need for
corresponding changes to local and third party data storage systems.
This could have unwelcome financial implications: third party suppliers,
for example, might charge hospitals to upgrade their software to reflect
the changes, and additional staffing might be needed for data input:
You need to resource both the system to do it and the
people to enter it. It isn't necessarily a by-product of
the care you're delivering, it can be an overhead, a bur-
den on top of the care […] So, you know, they're man-
dated, we're expected to do them […] but it's not as if
the audit comes with everything that's required to do
it. (Institutional information manager)
3.3 | Institutional perspectives on NCAs and the
impact on QI
Although institutional staff recognized the benefits of NCAs as reposi-
tories of valuable local and national data, the constraints identified
above led some to call for more co-ordination of NCAs nationally and
more consultation with hospitals about their resource implications.
Given the complexity and multiplicity of the demands on them, they
talked about a need to focus on institutional priorities, which, one
board member explained, included prioritizing responses to regulatory
bodies with the power to impose sanctions, like the Care Quality
Commission (CQC):
There are more and more pressures on us, and CQC
are top gun at the moment, so if CQC say: “Jump,”
we'll say: “How high?” kind of thing, because they have
regulatory powers over us. (Board member)
Whereas, the board member concluded: “these others”—NCAs
included—“we'll say we can't just yet.” In other words, given the con-
straints under which they were working, some institutional staff
questioned NCA legitimacy:
It seems like, to us, anybody can set up a NCA, send it
to us, and because they've managed to get the NCA
title to it, we have to just do it. (Board member)
An organisation such as ourselves, I think we partici-
pated in over 50 audits last year and submitted a huge
amount of data to some of them and […] it's a lot of
work for us. But the pay-off for that is that the national
organisation then analyses that data and in the report
actually gives us back something that's useful for us,
maybe in benchmarking ourselves against our peers or
in another form. If the reports don't do that, then it
raises the question of the value of that audit to this
organisation. (Institutional quality governance manager)
This could limit institutional support for QI initiatives, when clini-
cians made business cases for additional expenditure to address issues
flagged in NCA reports, which were not regarded as priorities by insti-
tutional bodies. Clinicians expressed frustration about this state of
affairs:
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If you present [the board] with a problem I think they
just think let's not look at that because it might cost us
some money. And they won't look at it unless someone
from NHS England comes to the Trust and says:
“You're a really badly performing Trust […] and we're
going to financially penalise you” and then suddenly
they want to do something. Whereas when it's a clini-
cian going: “We're supposed to perform at this level
and we're currently at this level and we need to do
something about it,” they're like: “Meh, tell me another
one, I hear that all the time.” (Consultant cardiologist)
Consequently, some clinicians in our study saw little point in
seeking institutional resource approval for QI arising from NCAs, caus-
ing them to question the value of audit participation altogether, as
another doctor put it:
You make the recommendations, and then next year
you do the same again. And nothing happens, at all.
Absolutely nothing, nothing changes. Why collect the
data? (Consultant cardiologist)
4 | DISCUSSION
The literature on use of NCAs and other national and international
audit and benchmarking systems paints a picture of varying engage-
ment and missed potential for QI, sometimes associated with insuffi-
cient institutional support.4,12,13 Our study highlights factors that may
generate outcomes like these, relating particularly to the way in which
managers, boards, and quality committees regard and use the audits,
and the effects on their relationships with clinical teams. Such findings
are important, given the significance accorded to organizational and
board oversight of QI,5,15,18,19 as well as the substantial healthcare
resources consumed by data collection and validation for NCAs in the
United Kindom4,20 and comparable systems worldwide that aim to
support quality improvement.21
In our study, institutional and clinical staff members' differing per-
ceptions of NCA legitimacy appear to be key to this outcome, when
they limit their responses to clinicians requesting action and expendi-
ture for QI, based on audit data. These differing perceptions were
encapsulated succinctly by the consultant cardiologist quoted above,
who contrasted clinicians' trust in NCA data—“We're supposed to per-
form at this level and we're currently at this level and we need to do
something about it”—with managerial doubts—“Meh, tell me another
one, I hear that all the time.”
Institutional theory emphasizes the importance of legitimacy as a
motivating factor for organizations and their managers, encouraging
them to respond to demands.22-24 We found this to be the case with
boards and their quality committees, which engaged with those NCAs
for which participation was mandated by NHS England; when they
appeared in public NCA reports not to be providing safe and effective
care; and when NCA performance was associated with financial or
reputational gain or penalties. However, when legitimacy or economic
gains are perceived to be low organizations are more likely to resist
demands, especially when working under pressure and responding to
multiple, conflicting constituencies.24 Dixon-Woods et al6 note that
such factors combine to create “priority thickets” (p. 109) which limit
boards' scope to develop unifying visions for patient safety and qual-
ity, and tend to generate a focus on compliance (QA) rather than
improvement (QI), as reflected in our study.
NCAs, then, may be regarded as another institutional demand
among very many. Managers' responses to these demands are shaped
by their explicit and implicit assessments of audit legitimacy, causing
some to prioritize work to avoid penalties and achieve incentives,
whilst giving less priority to other areas, such as QI expenditure based
on NCA data, requested by clinicians. This caused frustration in some
clinical teams, for whom NCAs were more of a priority, and a sense
that there was little point recommending QI based on their data. Ulti-
mately, this factor generated disengagement with NCAs for clinicians
and managers alike.
We suggest that addressing the constraints identified in our study
may enable reassessment of the audits' legitimacy by institutional
staff, thereby extending and enriching their use in QI both institution-
ally and clinically. This might be achieved if more suppliers move from
an emphasis on cumulative, retrospective reports to frequent, ideally
real-time, reporting, learning from best practice by bodies like the
National Hip Fracture Database, which, as well as providing live data
to hospitals on how they are meeting key performance indicators, also
provides interactive online charts, dashboards and benchmarking sum-
maries. It may also involve presenting audit results briefly and unam-
biguously, showing clearly the “headline” outcomes important to
institutional bodies and staff, and consulting with them about how
they would like to see them displayed. HQIP and the CQC have begun
to address this concern through the National Clinical Audit
Benchmarking (NCAB) project (https://ncab.hqip.org.uk/), which
offers concise synopses of performance in some key NCA metrics in a
standard format, using data from cumulative reports (for 24 NCAs,
March 2020).
Given institutional concerns about discrepancies between the
benefits and costs of audit participation, such work is also likely to
involve reducing the amount of resource hospitals need to devote to
NCA data collection and validation, which is significant, often involv-
ing clinicians and support staff gathering data laboriously from hard-
copy case notes. This may require further negotiation between hospi-
tals, HQIP and NCA suppliers about the nature and volume of data
the former are expected to provide; making more use of routinely-
collected data to populate NCA fields; and more use of interactive
technologies to explore and report data. Our own study focuses on
the latter area. We are developing a web-based dashboard—called
“QualDash”—which can be used by hospitals to explore their own
NCA data in depth (currently the dashboard displays only MINAP or
PICANet data, but focus groups will be held to explore its suitability
for a range of other NCAs). QualDash users can interrogate metrics
from the audits through interactive “qualcards,” to answer key ques-
tions about service performance. They can also examine related data
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in a number of sub-views, contextualized through a “history sub-view,”
which summarizes data over a 3 year period. Both raw data and the
qualcard charts can be downloaded and used, for example, to present
recent data at meetings or in business cases. Figure 1 shows PICANet
qualcards from the prototype dashboard, using simulated data.
Finally, whilst this paper has focused on national audit systems in
the UK, it has implications for users of audit and benchmarking
healthcare data in other countries that aim to make fuller and more
efficient use of those data for QA and QI. For example, it speaks to
the need to streamline data collection and minimize duplication, iden-
tified within Sweden's quality registries,25 and can contribute, too, to
international moves towards more fully digital healthcare systems.26
5 | STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
Research into NCAs has tended to focus on their use by clinicians.
We consider a strength of this study to be its dual focus on both clini-
cal and institutional involvement with NCAs, enabling us to under-
stand more fully the nuanced social and operational factors that
underpin previous findings. These understandings emerged from
detailed discussions with participants in qualitative interviews, which
we regard as another strength of the research, while acknowledging
their emergent and situated nature. We present these findings tenta-
tively, then, and aim to test and refine them in later phases of our
study, when we introduce QualDash to the five participating hospitals
and evaluate its impact through ethnographic observations.
We acknowledge too that our approach to sampling had limita-
tions. We focused particularly on two audits, MINAP and PICANet,
which afforded rich information about how NCAs with different char-
acteristics are used in different clinical areas. However, including an
audit at the forefront of live data reporting, like the National Hip Frac-
ture Database, would have enabled us to explore more fully new
approaches to promoting NCA use (although PICANet, for example, is
also working on making data available in novel ways, through its
recent initiative to report risk-adjusted resetting probability ratio test
plots to PICUs quarterly, to assist staff in monitoring standardized
mortality ratios). This limitation might be addressed in future research
by including an audit specifically on the basis of reporting innovation.
In addition, our sample was small, with only 11 participants work-
ing directly in institutional areas, which enabled us to explore their
responses in detail, but limits the generalisability of our findings. We
used a snowball approach, recruiting participants recommended to us
because of their existing involvement with NCAs, which could have
over-emphasized the views of people who were disproportionately
engaged with the audits, compared to other staff, or, conversely, of
those who were particularly disengaged with the audits and were con-
cerned to express that disengagement. Either way, in future research,
it may be advisable to interview some staff who have no particular
allegiance to NCAs, to obtain more general insights into how they are
viewed.
6 | CONCLUSION
NCAs' potential to assure and, critically, improve care quality may be
realized more fully from an institutional perspective by enhancing hos-
pital board and quality committee members' perceptions of the audits'
F IGURE 1 Prototype of PICANet dashboard (using simulated data)
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legitimacy. This is likely to require a rebalancing of the benefits and
costs to healthcare providers of participation in NCAs, involving fur-
ther negotiation about the nature and volume of data hospitals are
expected to collect and the timeliness and format of public reports
provided by suppliers, as well as wider use in hospitals of routine clini-
cal data and less manual data entry. In addition, further use of interac-
tive digital technologies, like the quality dashboard we are developing,
should help institutional and clinical staff to explore and report the
data in ways that are meaningful to them.
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